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In reality, it is a style, far more familiar—and far more dangerous. It is a carefully coated act of genocide relativism, FDLR rehabilitation, and selective truth-making, draped in the language of critical geopolitics.

The article, despite its anti-Rwanda tone—it is more pro-impunity, pro-genocide denial, and unquestionably associated with the long-standing ideological mission of Jambo Asbl: to launder génocidaire networks into respectability while delegitimizing any discourse that focuses on Tutsi vulnerability—whether in Rwanda or in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The sanitization of FDLR

Few sentences better demonstrate how denial dresses itself as analysis. 'The FDLR does not represent a strategic threat to Rwanda.' Says Ishimwe. The argument is very familiar and increasingly recycled: the FDLR has not launched 'major' cross-border attacks for over twenty years; most of its members were children or not yet born in 1994. Its members, according to Ishimwe—are socially embedded refugees rather than ideological actors. Hence, Rwanda’s security concerns are a political construction rather than a security reality. It sounds dignified, almost civilized. It is none of those things.

This type of reasoning depends much on a deliberate misinterpretation of how genocidal ideology works. Genocide is not a once-in-a-lifetime event frozen in time. This crime is an ideology with a memory, a pedagogy, and a lineage. Genocide survives precisely because it is transmitted—through language, myth, manufactured grievance, and political organization.

Time does not dissolve an ideology when its custodians remain alive, organized, and unrepentant. To argue otherwise is akin to claiming Adolf Hitler bore no responsibility for the Holocaust because he did not invent antisemitism. Hatred does not require novelty; it requires continuity.

The claim that the FDLR is harmless because it has not staged 'major' incursions into Rwanda for two decades is a morally vacant metric. Are recorded incursions inside Rwanda imaginary? Are killings in eastern Congo inconsequential because they happened on the wrong side of a border? Must violence be spectacular enough to qualify as threatening? This is selective blindness. To downplay these attacks is not neutrality—it is sympathy, bordering on disappointment that they were not deadlier.

More illuminating still is the argument that the majority of FDLR members are 'young people born and raised in exile' who have never set foot in Rwanda. This is presented as an exoneration. In reality, it is an indictment of the ideology’s survival. Being born in exile does not immunize one against genocidal indoctrination; it often deepens it.

History itself dismantles Ishimwe’s alibi. On 22 November 1992, Léon Mugesera delivered his infamous incendiary speech in Kabaya, openly calling for the extermination of Tutsi and lamenting that earlier pogroms had not gone far enough. In that speech, he declared:

'I recently said to someone who was boasting about being in the PL (Parti Liberal): 'The mistake we made in 1959, even though I was a child then, was that we let you leave.’ … Let me tell you that your home is in Ethiopia, and that we will send you back along the Nyabarongo river so you get there quickly.'

Mugesera was six years old in 1959, during the first mass anti-Tutsi pogroms he later regretted had been incomplete. Age did not prevent him from becoming one of the most articulate propagandists of genocidal ideology.

Mugesera was not convicted by the ICTR. Canada found him inadmissible for refugee protection, deported him to Rwanda, where he was tried and convicted by Rwandan courts for crimes of genocide. The correction only strengthens the point: genocidal ideology matures, travels, and waits—sometimes for decades.

Ishimwe also knows that Laure Uwase, a prominent Jambo Asbl figure, was two years old in 1994. Yet this did not prevent her from becoming active in an organization that defends convicted génocidaires, promotes genocide denial, and reframes perpetrators as victims. Youth did not neutralize the ideology. It ensured its afterlife.

Equally nonsensical is the invocation of the ICTR. The affirmation that the Tribunal 'never classified the FDLR as a genocidal organization' is technically factual and intellectually dishonest. The ICTR had a clearly defined temporal jurisdiction: crimes committed in 1994. It fulfilled that mandate. Expecting it to classify criminal organizations formed afterward is like accusing a court of carelessness for refusing to rule on crimes not yet committed. Ishimwe’s appeal to the ICTR is not legal reasoning—it is a desperate attempt to borrow relevance from an institution whose purpose is being maliciously misrepresented.

Then comes the sanitization by numbers: Rwanda, we are told by Ishimwe—integrated 'dozens' of former FDLR and ex-FAR members into its army and institutions. The arithmetic is ideological. It must be 'dozens,' not thousands, to sustain the insinuation that Rwanda’s institutions are ethnically exclusionary and that integration was cosmetic.

The truth is simpler and far less useful to the narrative: those integrated were individual Rwandans, processed as individuals, not as representatives of genocidal organizations. Anyone credibly implicated in genocide is held to account. Integration was not rehabilitation of the FDLR; it was dismantling it—one defector at a time.

This distinction matters. Rwanda does not negotiate with ideologies built on extermination. The FDLR, FDU-Inkingi, MRND, CDR, DALFA-Umulinzi and related political families share a machetocratic worldview—one that treats violence as heritage and denial as strategy. They will never ever be granted political oxygen—not because Rwanda is intolerant of dissent, but because no society negotiates with those who deny its dead.

The real complaint, therefore, is not falsification; it is exposure. The frustration that the 'neutralization of the FDLR' occupies a central place in the Washington framework is logical—for those who relied on vagueness as shelter. Once neutralization becomes an unambiguous policy, the linguistic hiding places vanish. The language of 'refugees,' 'social roots,' and 'political interlocutors' no longer protects what is, at its core, a criminal organization animated by an unreconstructed ideology.

This is where the argument shelters its analytical dress and reveals its emotional core. There is agony in the insistence that the FDLR be acknowledged, legitimized, raised up. Not the pain of marginalization, but the pain of losing cover. When the FDLR is named as a threat, those who speak for it like Jambo Asbl feel suddenly exposed—ideologically naked, stripped of euphemism.

FDLR leaders have never renounced genocidal ideology. Yet Ishimwe wants the reader to see them not as perpetrators or ideological heirs, but as wronged civilians unfairly criminalized by history. His article carries a barely concealed grief that the FDLR is treated as a threat rather than what he wishes it to be seen as: a legitimate political actor awaiting recognition.

Here, Jambo Asbl functions not as a watchdog but as a communications bureau for a genocidal militia, polishing language, reframing crimes, and lobbying for political rehabilitation.

To maintain that Rwanda’s security concerns are merely 'discursive constructions' is to ask survivors to believe in the same ideology that once told them extermination was a political necessity. It is to insist that memory surrender to convenience—and that history apologize for being inconvenient.

The FDLR is not dangerous because of what it has failed to do recently. It is dangerous because of what it refuses to renounce, what it continues to teach, and what it still dreams of becoming. Pretending otherwise is not scholarship. It is advocacy—thinly veiled, emotionally invested, and increasingly transparent.

Some opinions age badly. Others are born expired. This one belongs to the latter category.

Genocide warning as 'manipulation'

Norman Ishimwe’s attack on what he dismissively calls the 'Saving Narrative'—the claim that Congolese Tutsi, Banyamulenge, and other Rwandophone communities face an existential threat in the DRC—reveals more about the psychology of his political camp than about Rwanda’s diplomacy. What he presents as narrative deconstruction is, in fact, a textbook exercise in genocide trivialization, dressed up as media criticism.

At the core of Ishimwe’s argument lies a breathtaking proposition: that alerts about a possible genocide against Congolese Tutsi are not grounded in reality but are a strategic invention by Kigali, manufactured after 2022 for geopolitical convenience. According to this logic, history itself works on a timetable synchronized with presidential handshakes. When Kagame and Tshisekedi were cordial, no danger existed; when relations soured, genocide abruptly appeared—conveniently. It is more of magical thinking than analysis.

Genocide does not declare itself politely, nor does it wait for diplomatic frost. It grows in permissive environments—where hate speech circulates freely. It comes to the open when armed groups target civilians based on identity, and the state tolerates or cooperates with forces animated by exterminatory ideologies. Eastern Congo has offered precisely this environment for decades. To claim that warnings only emerged because Rwanda 'needed' them is to argue that smoke is invented by fire alarms.

Ishimwe is principally upset that Rwanda, UN bodies, and others speak openly of hate speech targeting Banyamulenge and Tutsi communities. But hate speech does not become imaginary because it is problematic to admit. When leaflets circulate calling Banyamulenge 'foreign invaders,' when armed groups chant slogans inherited from genocidal vocabularies, when massacres are selectively directed at civilians because of who they are— and not what they did—then warning language is not manipulation. It is our responsibility.

The effort to discredit evidence by calling videos 'unverifiable' or accounts 'fake' is equally revealing. In regions where whistleblowers are killed, access is restricted, and government sponsored militia control territory, evidence rarely arrives with the aesthetic neatness preferred by deniers. Yet Ishimwe’s standard is clear: unless suffering is documented in ways that absolve his ideological allies, it must be fabricated. This is not skepticism but curated disbelief.

More troubling is his portrayal of Rwanda’s diplomatic interventions—particularly Ambassador Martin Ngoga’s reference to his experience as a survivor of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi—as cynical emotional blackmail. In his machetocratic worldview, survivors are expected to forget their history precisely when they recognize its warning signs. For Jambo members, memory is tolerable only when it remains silent.

Ishimwe accuses Rwanda of 'instrumentalizing' the genocide. What he cannot say—but clearly feels—is something far more painful: that the genocide failed. The legitimacy acquired by the RPF in stopping it, saving lives, and ripping apart genocidal power structures remains an unendurable fact for political families whose worldview depended on the success of extermination. That legitimacy is not a myth. It is the residue of survival.

When Ishimwe claims that Rwanda is 'transposing' its 1994 legitimacy onto Congo, he reveals the true grievance. The problem is not that Rwanda warns against genocide; it is that Rwanda knows what genocide looks like before the world decides to notice. No country on this continent understands the cost of genocide like Rwanda does: over a million lives lost in less than one hundred days. That experience does not expire. It instructs.

The irony deepens when Ishimwe insists that genocide prevention discourse is merely a cover for aggression, while simultaneously defending or minimizing groups whose ideological ancestors carried machetes, not placards. This is the paradox of machetocratic psychology: violence is denied until it succeeds; warnings are ridiculed until it is too late.

Calling the fear of genocide a 'narrative' is an old trick. Holocaust deniers used it. Bosnia’s genocide was once dismissed the same way—until mass graves made the narrative indecent. The dead are always accused, posthumously, of exaggeration.

The real problem is not why Rwanda speaks of genocide prevention, but why others are so endowed in silencing that speech. Why does the mere invocation of Tutsi vulnerability provoke such hostility? Why must Banyamulenge or Hema suffering be downgraded to propaganda before it is even fully documented?

This is where organized amnesia becomes deadly. Organizations and individuals who promote forgetting do not merely misread history—they aggressively disarm societies against its repetition.

Imagine a world asked to forget cannibalism filmed on camera, women stripped naked and paraded publicly to humiliate their bodies into submission. Imagine too— villages burned to ash while perpetrators chant ethnic slurs, and survivors hunted not for what they did but for what they are.

Imagine all this dismissed as 'fake,' 'unverified,' or strategically inconvenient, not because it did not happen, but because acknowledging it would implicate the wrong people. This is how atrocity is laundered. When memory is framed as propaganda and evidence as manipulation, perpetrators are cleared and vindicated in advance, victims are rendered suspect, and violence is granted a second life—this time with intellectual respectability.

History teaches humanity, with brutal consistency, that genocide is never preceded by silence alone, but by campaigns demanding forgetfulness. And when amnesia is organized, coordinated, and rewarded, it becomes not an error of judgment, but an accomplice to future crimes.

Jambo’s ideological triage

What Ishimwe omits—systematically and deliberately—is that the FDLR’s political doctrine, command structures, symbols, and public communications remain explicitly anchored in genocide ideology. He ignores the group’s own statements glorifying the 1994 genocide, its continued use of genocidal rhetoric, and its persistent collaboration with Congolese armed groups engaged in anti-Tutsi violence.

More revealing still is what he does not demand. Nowhere does Ishimwe call on the FDLR to disarm, repatriate, or renounce its ideology. Instead, he reframes the group as a misunderstood 'residual' actor whose roots are 'social' rather than criminal. This rhetorical maneuver performs a precise function: transforming génocidaires from perpetrators into victims of narrative exaggeration.

This is classic Jambo Asbl doctrine. Genocide becomes an unfortunate historical footnote; génocidaire movements become political stakeholders; and accountability is recast as persecution.

At this point, clarity is required: any organization that defends, minimizes, or sanitizes the FDLR is categorically disqualified from the human rights ecosystem.

Human rights advocacy rests on three non-negotiable principles: recognition of victims, accountability for perpetrators, and rejection of genocidal ideology in all its forms. Jambo Asbl violates all three.

By systematically reframing the FDLR as 'misunderstood refugees,' by attacking efforts to neutralize a group rooted in genocide ideology, and by dismissing the fears and exterminatory experiences of Tutsi communities, Jambo abandons the universality of human rights and replaces it with ethnic selectivity and ideological loyalty.

Human rights organizations do not lobby for genocidal militias to be recognized as political interlocutors. They do not relativize genocide. They do not mock survivors’ fears as 'fake narratives.' When an organization crosses that line, it ceases to be a human rights actor and becomes what Jambo Asbl plainly is: an advocacy platform for denial, revisionism, and impunity.

AFC/M23 in reverse

Ishimwe accuses Rwanda of fabricating the Congolese identity of the AFC/M23. Yet he performs the mirror image of the same distortion: denying that Congolese Tutsi can ever be bona fide Congolese political actors unless sanctioned by Kinshasa’s ethno-nationalist orthodoxy.

By insisting that the AFC is merely a 'camouflage device' and that its fighters are essentially foreign or Rwandan-directed, Ishimwe reproduces the same exclusionary logic that has fueled decades of violence: Tutsi political agency is illegitimate by definition.

No Congolese community is subjected to this standard. Mai-Mai groups are Congolese despite external backing. Wazalendo militias remain Congolese despite ethnic targeting. Only Tutsi armed actors are eternally foreign—unless they are being killed, in which case their foreignness is conveniently forgotten.

His essay is a masterclass in narrative engineering—one in which génocidaires are softened, victims are erased, and ideology is re-baptized as critique.

Ishimwe’s article does not simply criticize Rwanda. He rehabilitates the FDLR as a political subject, minimizes genocidal violence against Congolese Tutsi, and advances a worldview in which Tutsi vulnerability is always suspect and never intrinsic.

This is not journalism or human rights activism. It is ideological continuity with the very forces that made genocide possible in the first place. Calling this 'truth' does not make it so. It makes it dangerous. And the world has seen—too many times—where such selective truths lead.

Ishimwe’s attempt to morally equate the FDLR with AFC/M23 is perhaps the most revealing maneuver in the article. His resentment that the FDLR is prioritized for eradication while AFC/M23 negotiates betrays his underlying goal: elevation of the FDLR into a negotiating partner with the Rwandan state.

This equivalence collapses instantly. Whatever one thinks of AFC/M23, it is recognized as a Congolese politico-military movement engaged in a political conflict. The FDLR, by contrast, is an organization born of genocide, sustained by genocide ideology, with Rwanda as its horizon.

To demand parity between the two is not peace-building. It is genocide normalization.

The center of moral illogicality

For Ishimwe to write that the discourse and acts of extermination 'did not exist' before 2022 and arose purely from Rwanda’s diplomatic needs is simply absurd. If that is the case—hundreds of thousands of Congolese refugees in Rwanda, Uganda and elsewhere, are people who left their country for greener pastures.

There is no engagement with documented massacres of Banyamulenge, no acknowledgment of ethnic cleansing in Minembwe, no reckoning with hate speech by Congolese officials, militia leaders, or media outlets calling Tutsi 'foreigners' to be eliminated. The suffering of Congolese Tutsi is treated not as human tragedy but as raw material for Rwandan propaganda.

The implication is unmistakable: Congolese Tutsi lives only matter insofar as they are useful to Kigali’s narrative. When they are butchered, displaced, or hunted, Ishimwe’s prose goes curiously silent. Their deaths are not tragedies to be confronted, but inconveniences to be rhetorically managed.

One searches in vain for even a single sentence expressing moral concern for these communities. Their extermination anxiety is dismissed as invention; their fear is pathologized as strategy.

Ishimwe repeatedly invokes 'empirical scrutiny,' 'evidence,' and 'reality,' yet his relationship with truth is profoundly instrumental. What aligns with his ideological posture is elevated to fact; what disrupts it is dismissed as fiction.

Thus, all reports documenting anti-Tutsi violence are treated as narrative products. Genocidal threats become 'unverifiable videos.' Meanwhile, his own assertions—unsupported by comparable scrutiny—are presented as self-evident. This is not unintentional. It reflects a deeper epistemology common to genocide denial circles: truth is not what is demonstrable, but what is politically useful.

In this framework, Rwanda lies by definition—while Jambo’s affiliates tell the truth by conviction. Evidence is judged not by verifiability but by alignment.

Let us now speak plainly without restraint. Jambo Asbl is not a misunderstood organization unfairly maligned by its critics. It is a theater of moral absurdity, where genocidal ideology is dressed in the language of victimhood, and where the denial of Tutsi suffering is marketed as critical thinking.

Its members speak of 'truth' while rejecting evidence, invoke 'human rights' while defending those who annihilated them, and posture as civil society while acting as a public relations annex for the FDLR.

To watch Jambo Asbl claim a seat at the human rights table is to witness the arsonist applying for a job as fire inspector—armed with a lecture on how flames are merely a narrative construct. Its representatives denounce 'instrumentalization of genocide' while instrumentalizing genocide denial; they accuse others of propaganda while recycling the talking points of convicted génocidaires; they demand moral seriousness while sneering at the graves of victims.

Even more astonishing are the diplomats, NGOs, and self-styled defenders of universal values who entertain Jambo Asbl as a legitimate interlocutor. One must ask: what ethical contortions are required to treat an organization that defends a genocidal militia as a human rights partner? What intellectual bankruptcy allows genocide denial to masquerade as dissent, and impunity to be confused with reconciliation?

There is something horrifically revealing in Jambo’s anguish that the FDLR is still considered a threat. These are not tears for peace; they are tears for lost political opportunity. The pain expressed is not humanitarian—it is strategic. It is the regret of those who believe history could be rewritten, crimes legalized, and the lethal ideology reborn under a new logo.

The world has seen this script before. In every genocide, there are killers, victims, and—eventually—apologists who insist that time has softened everything except the demand for accountability. Jambo Asbl has chosen its role with chilling clarity.

FDLR terrorist group was formed by remnant perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

Tom Ndahiro

The survey shows that the proportion of girls aged 15 to 19 who have ever been pregnant has fluctuated over the past two decades. In 2005 (DHS 3), the rate was 4 percent. By 2010 (DHS 4), it had risen to 6 percent, and in 2014—15 (DHS 5) it reached 7 percent. The rate dipped slightly to 5 percent in 2019—20 (DHS 6) but increased again to 8 percent in 2025 (DHS 7), signaling a concerning upward trend in recent years.

Education remains a key factor in teenage pregnancy. Adolescents with no formal education experience the highest rates, with 21 percent having been pregnant. Those who have completed primary education have a lower rate of 13 percent, while teenage girls with secondary education see the rate drop sharply to 4 percent.

'University-level data are not presented due to the limited number of observations in the sample,' the report reads, underlining the protective role of schooling for adolescent girls.

The findings present a contrast within Rwanda’s broader health progress. The same survey reports a declining total fertility rate, now at 3.7 births per woman, down from 4.1 five years ago, alongside record-high use of modern family planning methods among married women.

Maternal care indicators are also near universal, with 98 percent of births assisted by skilled health providers and delivered in health facilities.

The survey further highlights worrying trends among young people, including a decline in comprehensive knowledge of HIV prevention among youth aged 15—24, suggesting the need for renewed awareness campaigns targeting adolescents.

Conducted between June and October 2025, the RDHS7 covered more than 14,500 households nationwide, providing nationally representative data on fertility, maternal and child health, nutrition, HIV, and mortality. The full report is expected to inform future policy interventions aimed at protecting adolescents and sustaining Rwanda’s gains in public health.

The survey shows that the proportion of girls aged 15 to 19 who have ever been pregnant rose from 5 percent in 2019—20 to 8 percent in 2025.

Wycliffe Nyamasege

The TFR, which indicates the average number of children a woman would have over her lifetime, fell from 4.1 in the 2019-2020 survey.

The decline is evident nationwide, with the sharpest drops in the Western Province (from 4.0 to 3.4) and Northern Province (from 4.1 to 3.8).

Urban areas maintained a stable rate of 3.4, while rural areas saw a decrease from 4.3 to 3.9.

The City of Kigali recorded the lowest TFR at 3.1, followed by the South Province at 3.8 and the East Province at 4.0. The trend is largely attributed to rising family planning adoption.

According to the survey, modern contraceptive use among women in unions surged to 78% from 64% in prior surveys, with injectables (34%) and implants (25%) being the most popular methods.

Among married women, about half still desire more children, but preferences have shifted: only 13% want another soon, 37% prefer to delay, and 47% want no more or have been sterilized.

The RDHS7 also highlights broader health progress. Maternal mortality has plummeted from 1,071 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 149 in 2025, while under-5 mortality stands at 36 per 1,000 live births.

The RDHS7, conducted between June and October 2025, surveyed over 14,500 households across the country, offering comprehensive, nationally representative data on key issues such as fertility, maternal and child health, nutrition, HIV, and mortality.

The report shows that maternal mortality has plummeted from 1,071 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 149 in 2025, while under-5 mortality stands at 36 per 1,000 live births.

IGIHE

The institution’s leadership disclosed this on Tuesday, December 16, 2025, during a meeting with EADB and its development partners.

Alphonse M. Ngabonziza, CEO of Duterimbere IMF Plc, said EADB’s backing has enabled the institution to expand financial services for small and large businesses, as well as households across Rwanda.

'In 2023, Duterimbere received a Frw 3.5 billion loan from EADB, which strengthened our capacity to finance projects in agriculture, livestock, trade, and service sectors,' Ngabonziza said.

The support allowed Duterimbere to provide loans to 344 clients, positively impacting more than 1,032 people and creating 1,321 new jobs.

Ngabonziza also highlighted the institution’s commitment to gender equality, noting that 93% of beneficiaries were women.

'This support has empowered youth, women, and small traders, helping them grow their businesses and improve livelihoods,' he said.

He added that Duterimbere IMF Plc plans to continue its partnership with EADB and remains committed to opening new opportunities for clients to drive Rwanda’s economic growth.

Margarita Uwantege, a long-time client of Duterimbere, shared how the institution helped her grow her business.

'I started with small savings in 2000, buying a chicken to begin farming. In 2007, I received a Frw 50,000 loan from Duterimbere, which I topped up with my own savings to purchase cows. Today, I trade car and motorcycle parts and have been able to pay for my five children’s university education,' she said.

Duterimbere IMF Plc, a community development microfinance institution, began its partnership with EADB in 2023. With 19 branches across Rwanda, it continues to play a key role in supporting inclusive financial growth in the country.

Alphonse M. Ngabonziza, Chief Executive Officer of Duterimbere IMF Plc, said support from the East African Development Bank (EADB) has strengthened the institution’s ability to support small and large enterprises, as well as households across Rwanda.

Ngabonziza also highlighted the institution’s commitment to gender equality, noting that 93% of beneficiaries were women.

Margarita Uwantege, a long-time client of Duterimbere, shared how the institution helped her grow her business.

The meeting brought together EADB and its partners, including Duterimbere IMF Plc.

IGIHE

“If the EU and EU Member States insist on continuing to restrict, limit, and deter the competitiveness of U.S. service providers through discriminatory means, the United States will have no choice but to begin using every tool at its disposal to counter these unreasonable measures,” said the USTR in a post on the social platform X.

According to the USTR, potential countermeasures could include assessing fees or imposing restrictions on foreign services. The agency also warned that it could adopt a similar approach toward other countries pursuing what it called an EU-style regulatory strategy in this area.

The USTR alleged that the EU and certain member states have pursued a sustained pattern of discriminatory and harassing lawsuits, taxes, fines, and directives targeting U.S. service providers.

“The United States has raised concerns with the EU for years on these matters without meaningful engagement or basic acknowledgement of U.S. concerns,” the USTR added.

The USTR also said EU service providers have operated freely in the United States for decades, benefiting from access to the U.S. market and consumers, while naming several European technology giants with expansive presence in the country.

The latest remarks reflect growing frustration among U.S. officials over the EU’s tightening technology regulations and lawsuits targeting U.S. tech giants.

The European Commission has recently opened two antitrust investigations into U.S. tech giants Google and Meta, and fined Elon Musk’s platform X 120 million euros (about 140 million U.S. dollars) in its first non-compliance decision under the Digital Services Act.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) on Tuesday threatened to take countermeasures against the EU over what it described as the bloc’s controversial regulations on service providers.

Xinhua

In the latest episode of China Economic Roundtable, an all-media talk show hosted by Xinhua News Agency, guest speakers shared insights into the significance of the Hainan FTP and its upcoming special customs operations.

“Accelerating the development of free trade ports is a concrete move to show the world that China’s door to opening up will not be closed, but will only open wider,” said Huang Hanquan, head of the Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research under the National Development and Reform Commission.

“The launch of island-wide special customs operations reflects China’s resolve to address external uncertainties with the certainty of expanded high-standard opening up, injecting new vitality into both the Chinese economy and global growth,” Huang said.

Located in China’s southernmost island province, the Hainan FTP is the country’s largest special economic zone and a key testing ground for deepening reform and opening up. Under the special customs operations, the Hainan FTP will implement a supervision model featuring “freer access at the first line, regulated access at the second line, and free flows within the island.”

The “first line,” linking Hainan with overseas markets, will allow most imported goods to enter tariff-free with faster clearance, while the “second line,” referring to the customs boundary between Hainan and the mainland, will apply standard customs oversight to ensure fairness and prevent smuggling.

Starting Thursday, the share of zero-tariff products in the Hainan FTP will surge from 21 percent to 74 percent, with the number of tariff-free items expanding from about 1,900 to 6,637, covering nearly all production equipment and raw materials.

POLICY BENEFITS

“Island-wide special customs operations will bring a more open trade environment and a more efficient allocation of production factors, creating major development opportunities,” said Xue Zengyi, senior vice chairman of CP Group Agro-industry & Food Business, China Area.

Xue illustrated the impact with a simple calculation: the group’s coffee business will benefit from the free trade port’s zero-tariff policy on raw and auxiliary materials, reducing import costs by 8 percent in tariffs and 13 percent in value-added tax on green coffee beans, significantly lowering raw material expenses.

One of the earliest foreign-invested enterprises to establish a presence in Hainan, CP Group has operated in the province for nearly four decades. Starting with agriculture and animal husbandry, it has expanded into seven sectors, including aquaculture and coffee, and now runs 13 enterprises with a total investment of 2 billion yuan (about 283.4 million U.S. dollars).

The launch of island-wide special customs operations marks a milestone in the development of the Hainan FTP, with a raft of preferential policies expected to deliver tangible gains for businesses and residents in Hainan.

Huang said that the preferential tax policies will significantly reduce operating costs in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and high-end manufacturing, help attract industrial clustering, and spur the development of emerging industries, including offshore wind power and commercial spaceflight.

For Hainan residents, the expanded range of offshore duty-free goods and optimized shopping policies are expected to invigorate the local consumer market. Hainan’s distinctive development models are also set to spur a new wave of growth in modern service sectors such as healthcare and education, Huang added.

As part of efforts to advance the construction of the Hainan FTP, China earlier this year improved the island’s offshore duty-free shopping policies, including measures to broaden the scope of eligible duty-free goods. Since the policy took effect on Nov. 1, offshore duty-free sales have exceeded 1.5 billion yuan.

INSTITUTIONAL OPENING UP

“Island-wide special customs operations mark a new starting point for the opening up and development of the Hainan FTP, rather than the finish line,” Huang said. He added that China will gradually expand opening-up at the “first line,” further ease trade administration, and work to build a special customs supervision zone with international competitiveness and influence.

Hainan will align itself with high-standard international economic and trade rules in areas such as cross-border data flows and intellectual property protection. The institutional innovations accumulated in the process can be replicated nationwide, helping propel deeper domestic reforms, said Huang.

In terms of industry and investment, Hainan’s policy advantages are expected to attract global capital into sectors such as tourism and education, while fostering a trade model linking raw materials from Southeast Asia, processing in Hainan, and distribution in the mainland, positioning the island as a hub connecting domestic and international markets and helping optimize China’s overall trade network.

In the financial sector, improvements to the multi-functional free trade account system will broaden channels for cross-border financing and investment, facilitating the entry of foreign capital into the Chinese market and supporting outbound investment by domestic firms. This will help diversify China’s approaches to both utilizing foreign investment and investing abroad, Huang added.

Official data show that since 2020, more than 9,600 foreign-invested enterprises have been newly established in Hainan, with investors from 176 countries and regions. With the launch of island-wide special customs operations, Hainan is expected to strengthen further its role as a headquarters base for overseas companies entering the Chinese market.

In recent years, Hainan’s foreign trade has demonstrated strong growth momentum. In 2024, the total volume of Hainan’s goods imports and exports reached 277.65 billion yuan — up 20 percent year on year and nearly 200 percent compared to 2020.

Xue said that while CP Group continues to deepen its presence in the Hainan market through product innovation and expanded investment, it will also make full use of the advantages of the Hainan FTP to bring Hainan’s distinctive agricultural products to international markets.

Xinhua

Wang Fengli, deputy director of the Office of the Free Trade Port Working Committee of the Communist Party of China Hainan Provincial Committee, made the remarks in the latest episode of China Economic Roundtable, an all-media talk show hosted by Xinhua News Agency.

Following the launch, the Hainan FTP will see a sharp rise in its level of zero-tariff treatment, said Wang. The number of tariff lines eligible for zero tariffs will expand from about 1,900 to around 6,600, lifting the overall zero-tariff ratio from 21 to 74 percent.

Beyond zero tariffs, lower tax rates form another major policy advantage of the Hainan FTP, Wang said, noting that companies can benefit from multiple policies across different stages of production and operation.

He cited the example of a biopharmaceutical company. During the construction and research phase, imported raw materials and equipment can qualify for zero tariffs, reducing import costs by 5 to 10 percent. In manufacturing, products made with zero-tariff imported inputs and meeting a value-added ratio of 30 percent or more can be shipped to the Chinese mainland free of import duties.

Once profitable, the company can also benefit from a preferential corporate income tax rate of 15 percent, while its executives and technical staff may qualify for a 15 percent personal income tax rate, the official said.

Taken together, these measures offer companies opportunities for development across the entire industrial chain, Wang said.

Local residents will also see tangible benefits after the launch of special customs operations, the official added. One key change is access to a wider range of duty-free goods.

Authorities are studying tax policies for imported goods consumed by island residents, with plans to introduce a positive-list system that would allow residents to purchase selected imported products duty-free, according to Wang.

“Increased opportunities for international exchanges and cooperation are expected to make work and daily life on the island more convenient and diverse,” said the official.

Xinhua

Huang, head of the Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research, made the remarks in the latest episode of China Economic Roundtable, an all-media talk show hosted by Xinhua News Agency.

During the talk show, Huang highlighted several landmark policies, noting that the share of tariff lines covered by zero-tariff treatment at the Hainan Free Trade Port (FTP) will rise to roughly 70 percent, alongside optimized rules that allow duty-free treatment for value-added processing.

According to Huang, the measures are expected to significantly reduce operating costs for industries such as pharmaceuticals and high-end manufacturing, encourage industrial clustering, and accelerate the development of emerging sectors, including offshore wind power and commercial space.

Meanwhile, expanded duty-free shopping options for travelers and improved purchasing policies for island residents are expected to further stimulate local consumption, Huang noted.

Favorable tax policies are also central to the new economic landscape of Hainan FTP. “Preferential income tax rates will attract more companies and skilled workers, creating higher-quality jobs and reinforcing a virtuous cycle between industry development, talent inflows and economic growth,” Huang added.

Beyond the island, the launch of island-wide special customs operations is expected to reshape regional development patterns by easing barriers to the movement of goods, capital, and other factors of production, Huang believes. “Hainan will integrate more closely with surrounding regions, fostering coordinated development across southern China.”

At the national level, Huang described the move as a key step in China’s shift from an opening-up model focused on the flow of goods and other factors to one centered on institutional opening-up.

Hainan is expected to align more closely with high-standard international economic and trade rules, including those governing cross-border data flows and intellectual property protection, Huang said, adding that successful institutional innovations could be replicated nationwide.

“Launched against a backdrop of rising protectionism and headwinds to globalization, the special customs operations could provide international investors and traders a more stable and predictable institutional environment,” said Huang.

Xinhua

Huang, head of the Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research, made the remarks during the latest episode of China Economic Roundtable, an all-media talk show hosted by Xinhua News Agency.

The Thursday launch marks a major milestone in the opening-up drive of the world’s second-largest economy. This move sends a tangible message to the world: China has made a significant decision to open up further, Huang said.

It also aims to set a benchmark for higher-level opening-up, inject new momentum into upholding multilateralism and free trade, and foster inclusive and universally beneficial economic globalization, according to Huang.

“It is a strategic move to align with high-standard international economic and trade rules and steadily expand institutional opening-up,” Huang noted. “This provides an important platform for China to better adapt to and utilize international economic and trade rules while actively participating in their formulation.”

Huang believes that China’s economy has transitioned from rapid growth to high-quality development and is now at a critical stage of transforming growth model, optimizing economic structure, and shifting growth drivers.

As a key testing ground for reform in China, Hainan shoulders the important mission of paving new paths and accumulating fresh experience for building a high-standard socialist market economy, particularly in key areas such as trade and investment, fiscal and financial systems, and government regulation, Huang added.

Xinhua

Throughout the year, Rwanda’s influence on the international stage has continued to grow. The country garnered widespread recognition for its strong governance, diplomatic efforts, and flourishing international trade, particularly in tea, coffee, and minerals.

Additionally, Rwanda’s vibrant tourism industry and its prominent role as a host for international conferences further elevated its global profile. These efforts helped Rwanda attract over 1.15 million visitors during the 2024/2025 period, cementing its position as an increasingly influential global player.

In the realm of diplomacy, Rwanda continued to expand its influence opening new embassies around the world. In return, several countries have also chosen to establish embassies in Rwanda.

One such move took place in Luxembourg, where Rwanda’s first ambassador, Munyangaju Aurore Mimosa, arrived in March 2025. She assumed duties after presenting her credentials to the King of Luxembourg.

Luxembourg, located in the heart of Europe, borders Belgium to the north and west, France to the south, and Germany to the east. Situated over 6,300 kilometers from Rwanda, Luxembourg is not known for its high mountains, with its highest point, Kneiff, reaching only 560 meters above sea level.

With a population of just over 670,000 and an area of 2,586 square kilometers, Luxembourg is more than 10 times smaller than Rwanda. Nearly half of Luxembourg’s population is foreign-born, and its citizens speak three languages: French, German, and Luxembourgish.

Rwanda expands relations with Pakistan

In April 2025, Rwanda opened a new embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, with Fatou Harerimana serving as Rwanda’s ambassador to Pakistan. Since the embassy’s opening, several initiatives aimed at enhancing trade and investment between the two countries have been launched.

Key developments include the possibility of direct flights between Rwanda and Pakistan, and exploring potential areas of collaboration.

Pakistan established its embassy in Rwanda in 2021. Following the opening of Rwanda’s embassy in Islamabad, both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on diplomatic training in April 2025.

Growing relations with Algeria

In July 2025, Rwanda appointed Vincent Karega as its first ambassador to Algeria.

He presented his credentials in October 2025 to Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, marking an important step in strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries.

In a message shared on his X account on October 28, 2025, Amb. Karega expressed his delight at becoming Rwanda’s first resident ambassador to Algeria.

'I am honored to officially present to President Tebboune of Algeria my letters of credence as the first resident Rwandan Ambassador. Rwanda and Algeria are determined to elevate our bilateral and continental relations to the highest level,' he noted.

Rwanda and Algeria have maintained cooperation in areas such as security and education, with several Rwandan students pursuing studies in Algeria, a country where Arabic, French, and Tamazight are the official languages.

Since 1982, the two nations have signed various agreements covering economic cooperation, social development, cultural exchange, and other fields.

In December 2023, Algeria opened its embassy in Rwanda, demonstrating a renewed commitment to strengthening diplomatic ties.

On June 3, 2025, President Paul Kagame paid a state visit to Algeria, where he toured the National School of Artificial Intelligence, which also hosts Rwandan students.

During the visit, he held talks with President Tebboune focused on promoting stronger African cooperation in areas such as cross-border trade.

Before his new appointment, Ambassador Karega served as Rwanda’s envoy to South Africa until 2019, after which he was posted to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He left the DRC in 2022, following heightened diplomatic tensions between the two countries.

On December 20, 2024, he was appointed Rwanda’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, prior to taking up his current role as Ambassador to Algeria.

New embassies in Kigali

In 2025, Rwanda’s diplomatic relations expanded significantly, as countries from all over the world chose to open embassies in Kigali. One notable example is Brazil, which decided to appoint its ambassador to Rwanda, ending years of reliance on its embassy based in Kenya.

Irene Vida Gala, Brazil’s first ambassador to Rwanda, expressed that Brazil hopes to learn from Rwanda’s success in reconciliation and peacebuilding. She also shared her vision of seeing “Visit Rwanda” on the shirts of Brazilian football teams.

Ambassador Gala also emphasized that both nations would work together to enhance cooperation in areas such as agriculture, livestock, and tourism.

Brazil’s new ambassador to Rwanda, Irene Vida Gala presented her credentials to President Paul Kagame in September 2025.

Denmark commits to enhancing trade with Rwanda

In August 2025, Denmark opened its embassy in Rwanda, appointing Casper Stenger Jensen as the first Danish ambassador.

After presenting his credentials to President Kagame, Ambassador Jensen outlined his focus on strengthening investment and trade relations between the two nations.

Denmark has embassies in 11 countries across Africa, and Rwanda is now a key part of their diplomatic outreach.

In the same year, Gabon also appointed its first ambassador to Rwanda, with a primary focus on promoting economic, cultural, and educational cooperation.

Gabon is home to over 2,000 Rwandan students who are currently studying at various institutions in Rwanda.

Switzerland’s Embassy in Rwanda

Although Rwanda and Switzerland have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960, Switzerland officially opened its embassy in Kigali on November 20, 2025.

The embassy’s opening aligns with the country’s ongoing regional development efforts and bolsters Switzerland’s image as a strong advocate for peace and security.

In December 2025, Poland also opened its embassy in Rwanda, following Rwanda’s decision to open its embassy in Poland in 2021.

On November 13, 2024, Rwanda and Poland signed the Basic Air Service Agreement (BASA), which focuses on expanding air cooperation between the two countries.

Education continues to be a cornerstone of cooperation, as the 2022 Rwanda-Poland Education Forum led to agreements between universities in both countries. Poland has hosted over 1,500 Rwandan students, making them the largest group of foreign students from a single country in Poland.

Currently, Rwanda is represented by 49 ambassadors across the globe and has one Consul General. Together, these diplomats oversee Rwanda’s interests across 147 countries, with 37 honorary consuls representing Rwanda’s interests in 17 countries.

Rwanda is an active member of 200 international organizations, and 47 embassies are based in Kigali.

Additionally, there are 31 diplomats representing international organizations in Rwanda, 22 diplomats representing the interests of different countries, while 71 countries are represented by non-resident envoys in Rwanda.

Rwanda’s first ambassador arrived in Luxembourg in March 2025.

IGIHE