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The conference, titled 'Belgium's Colonial Injustice and the 101-Year Path to Reparations,' was held on August 21 and organized by the Baku Initiative Group (BIG).

The discussions took place on August 21 during a conference titled 'Belgium's Colonial Injustice and the 101-Year Path to Reparations,' organized by the Baku Initiative Group (BIG).

The meeting brought together representatives of Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC, Morocco and South Africa, alongside UN Human Rights Council experts, diplomats, parliamentarians, human rights advocates, historians and international law experts.

Rwanda was represented by Lt Gen (Rtd) Charles Kayonga, the country's ambassador to Türkiye, who also represents Rwanda in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Lebanon.

Participants examined the historical, political, economic and social consequences of Belgian colonial rule and discussed whether its legacy continues to shape the region. They also considered the restoration of historical justice, reparations and the return of cultural heritage taken from Central Africa during the colonial period.

A colonial legacy across the Great Lakes

Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC came under Belgian colonial rule in the aftermath of the First World War. Belgian administration of Ruanda-Urundi, which comprised present-day Rwanda and Burundi, began in 1916 after Germany lost control of the territory.

The Belgian colonial period formally ended as the countries gained independence between 1960 and 1962, but participants at the Baku conference argued that its effects have continued to be reflected in political, economic and social structures.

In Rwanda, the country had first been placed under German rule in the late 19th century, following the European partition of Africa associated with the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885.

Belgian rule later introduced policies that placed particular emphasis on economic production for colonial interests, including export-oriented agriculture and compulsory labour.

The colonial administration also played a significant role in reshaping Rwanda's social and political structures. One of the most contested aspects of this period was the way Belgian authorities classified Rwandans along ethnic lines and institutionalized those classifications through identity documents.

Those policies contributed to the entrenchment of divisions that later continued under successive post-independence governments.

The colonial legacy remains a subject of debate in Rwanda, particularly because of the way policies introduced during the Belgian period were later maintained and adapted by governments after independence.

Rwanda became independent on July 1, 1962, while Belgian influence remained present during the early years of the new state.

The political divisions that had been reinforced during the colonial period continued into the First and Second Republics and formed part of the broader historical context preceding the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

Calls for historical justice

At the Baku conference, BIG Executive Director Abbas Abbasov said addressing colonial crimes should go beyond financial compensation.

He called for recognition of historical responsibility, official apologies, reparations and legal safeguards, noting that the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi have long awaited concrete action.

Abbasov said reparations should be pursued transparently and in accordance with international law.
Rwanda's Ambassador Charles Kayonga said colonialism had left a lasting legacy that continues to affect former colonies.

He underscored the need to address that legacy in discussions on responsibility and reparations.

Participants also discussed the appropriation and restitution of cultural heritage from the colonial period, noting that Belgium's Royal Museum for Central Africa holds around 85,000 objects from Central Africa.

The conference further highlighted the five forms of reparation set out in UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.

The discussions come as debates continue across Africa over the historical consequences of slavery and colonialism, with countries and organizations increasingly examining how historical injustices can be addressed through recognition, restitution and reparations.

Participants at the Baku conference called for greater international recognition of colonial-era injustices, stronger legal mechanisms and more systematic discussions on reparations.

They stressed that restoring historical justice is important not only for addressing the past, but also for building a fairer international system for future generations.

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/rwanda-burundi-and-drc-discuss-belgiums-colonial-legacy-and-reparations/

Now, that familiar machine is changing. The emergence of electric motorcycles such as Spiro's electric bikes is quietly challenging one of the oldest assumptions in African transport: that moving around the city must depend on petrol. The significance is not simply that the bikes are electric.

It is what happens to the economics of the motorcycle when petrol disappears from the equation.
A conventional motorcycle requires a rider to repeatedly spend money on fuel. An electric motorcycle replaces that recurring fuel expense with electricity and, in Spiro's model, battery swapping. Instead of waiting for a battery to recharge, riders can exchange it for a charged one and return to the road.

For a motorcycle taxi rider whose income depends on how many trips can be completed in a day, that is not a technological curiosity.

It is a business proposition. And this is where Africa's electric-mobility story becomes particularly interesting.

The continent does not need to copy the electric-vehicle transition taking place in Europe, China or North America. Its transport realities are different.

Africa has enormous motorcycle fleets, rapidly growing cities, relatively low car ownership and millions of people whose livelihoods depend directly or indirectly on two-wheel transport.

That makes the electric motorcycle one of the most logical entry points into mass electrification.
Spiro's experience illustrates the potential. The company says it has deployed more than 95,000 electric motorcycles across African markets and built more than 2,500 battery-swapping stations. It is effectively testing whether electric mobility can become part of everyday African commerce rather than remaining a premium product for wealthier consumers.

The implications go beyond the rider. Every electric motorcycle creates demand for a wider ecosystem: batteries, swapping stations, electricity, software, maintenance, financing and technical skills.
That ecosystem could eventually become an industrial opportunity.

This is perhaps the most important part of the story. Africa has historically been a major consumer of imported transport technology. The electric-mobility transition gives the continent an opportunity to do something different.

Instead of simply importing electric motorcycles, Africa could increasingly assemble them, maintain them, develop the software that manages their fleets, build charging and swapping networks, and eventually manufacture more of the components.

The motorcycle could therefore become the starting point for something much larger.

But there is a warning. Electric motorcycles will not automatically transform African transport. The transition requires affordable financing, reliable electricity, sufficient battery infrastructure and policies that make it possible for businesses to invest for the long term.

Governments also need to think beyond incentives for buying electric vehicles.

They should be asking a more ambitious question: what African industry do we want the electric-mobility transition to create?

Rwanda has an opportunity to be part of that answer. Its experience with electric motorcycles provides a practical laboratory for understanding what happens when technology meets one of Africa's most important transport sectors.

Spiro's electric bikes are therefore worth watching for a reason that goes beyond their batteries.
They represent a test of whether Africa can turn a daily necessity – the motorcycle – into a platform for a new industrial economy.

The real revolution may not be the moment Africa buys its millionth electric motorcycle.
It may be the moment the continent stops seeing electric mobility simply as a cleaner way to move and starts seeing it as a way to build, employ, innovate and compete.

That is when the electric motorcycle stops being just a vehicle. It becomes infrastructure for Africa's future.

The writer, Innocent Ninsiima Ihinda, is a Government Relations Strategist.

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/the-motorcycle-that-could-change-how-africa-moves/

In minutes, they took four masterworks by 15th-century painter Antonello da Messina, the city's native artist. The loot included three panels from the 1473 San Gregorio Polyptych and a double-sided devotional panel featuring the Virgin Mary and Christ, which was cut out of an armored glass display case.

The stolen pieces carry an estimated valuation of $80 million to $92 million (about Rwf 136 billion) on the open art market. Yet, this heist leaves behind an intriguing economic contradiction: the stolen works are almost impossible to convert into cash.

Antonello da Messina (c. 1430–1479) is a central figure of the Early Italian Renaissance. He bridged the gap between Northern and Southern European traditions by introducing Flemish oil-painting techniques, known for luminous light and fine detail, to the structured geometry of Italian painting. Fewer than 40 confirmed works by Antonello survive globally.

Earlier this year, the Italian government bought his devotional painting Ecce Homo at a Sotheby's sale for $14.9 million. The four pieces stolen in Messina represented the last remaining Antonello masterpieces in his hometown, having survived the catastrophic 1908 earthquake that destroyed the original monastery where the San Gregorio altarpiece was housed.

For the perpetrators, the stolen masterpieces present a severe operational challenge because famous art cannot be sold through legitimate market channels. Once an artwork of this caliber is entered into global police networks and INTERPOL's Stolen Works of Art Database, legitimate auction houses, private dealers, and galleries cannot touch it.

Art crime specialists note that on the illicit market, stolen masterworks rarely function as liquid assets. Instead, they typically move through three main channels: as non-monetary collateral for transactions between criminal syndicates (such as securing loans for arms or narcotics trades), held hostage for 'artnapping' ransoms or legal plea bargains, or, in rare instances, kept concealed in private spaces for corrupt collectors.

During the getaway, two additional altarpiece panels that had been taken were abandoned outside the museum building and subsequently recovered by police. This sudden abandonment suggests the thieves faced physical weight or time constraints during their escape.

The remaining missing pieces represent a significant cultural loss for Messina, stripping the city of the last surviving works by its most influential artist. The Carabinieri's specialized art protection unit continues its investigation, seeking to recover the missing panels before they disappear into illegal underworld networks.

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/messina-heist-why-stolen-masterpieces-cant-simply-be-sold/

The commitment is contained in the AfDB Group's 2025 Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR) report for Rwanda, released on August 20, 2026, which assesses the performance of Bank-funded operations in the country as of November 2025.

According to the report, Rwanda's active AfDB portfolio is heavily concentrated in infrastructure, which accounts for 87% of total commitments. Water supply and sanitation alone represents 34% of the portfolio, followed by energy at 30%, multi-sector operations at 11%, finance at 10%, and transport at 9%. By contrast, agriculture, communications, social and urban development together make up just 6% of the portfolio's value.

The report describes this infrastructure dominance as reflecting the Bank's 'longstanding support to the government's foundational utility priorities,' but warns that such concentration 'poses a significant risk, potentially constraining the case for additional stand-alone infrastructure investments.'

In response, and in direct alignment with Rwanda's Second National Strategy for Transformation (NST2, 2024/25–2028/29), the Government of Rwanda has requested a strategic pivot toward agriculture. The reorientation is intended to rebalance the portfolio, mitigate concentration risk, and 'catalyse
transformative growth in high-priority productive sectors,' the report states.

NST2 itself prioritises private sector-led growth, agricultural modernisation, and export-oriented manufacturing, alongside efforts to accelerate inclusive growth and create jobs for youth and women.

Existing agriculture pipeline

The planned $400 million push builds on a currently modest agriculture portfolio. As of January 2026, AfDB-financed agriculture operations in Rwanda stood at just UA 11.2 million (approximately $15.2 million), representing only 9.2% disbursement, and centred on the Development of Agroforestry and Sustainable Agriculture project.

A larger agriculture operation is already in the pipeline: the Climate Smart Agriculture Results-Based Financing (RBF) programme, valued at USD 348 million (UA 254 million), blending ADF and ADB loan financing, according to the report's annex on the Indicative Operations Programme.

Wider portfolio

The agriculture pivot comes against the backdrop of a rapidly growing but increasingly strained AfDB portfolio in Rwanda. As of 31 January 2026, the Bank's active portfolio comprised 29 operations, 27 public sector and 2 private sector, with total commitments $2.6 billion), a 71% increase from $1.49 billion) in November 2023.

However, the share of red-flagged projects facing performance challenges doubled from 13% in 2023 to 26% in 2025, driven largely by procurement delays and weaknesses in contract management. The cumulative disbursement rate across the portfolio currently stands at 36%.

The Bank and the Government of Rwanda, through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), have endorsed a 2025 Country Portfolio Improvement Plan (CPIP) aimed at addressing these bottlenecks, including measures to fast-track project readiness, strengthen contract management, and streamline procurement processes.

The 2025 CPPR report has been submitted for information to the AfDB's Committee on Operations and Development Effectiveness (CODE).

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/afdb-to-invest-rwf590-billion-in-rwandas-agriculture-over-next-three-years/

The three are Henriette Buyukenya, Aline Umutoni and Regine Mukayiranga.

The tournament kicks off on Friday, August 21, at Kigali Pele Stadium, with teams competing for a place in the group stage of the CAF Women's Champions League.

Ahead of the competition, the Council of East and Central African Football Associations (CECAFA) announced the officials who will oversee the matches.

Ali Ahmed, a member of the CECAFA Referees Committee, said the officials are in good condition and ready for the tournament.

'We are pleased with the level of the referees and their assistants who have been invited and are here today. We are confident that they will give their best to ensure that the matches run smoothly,' he said.

The tournament will run from August 21 to 31 in Kigali and will feature 10 teams. A total of eight referees and nine assistant referees have been appointed for the competition.

Umutoni is the only Rwandan referee on the list. She recently officiated at the Women's Africa Cup of Nations in Morocco and will be joined in Kigali by Kenya's Josephine Wanjiku, who also officiated at the continental tournament.

The other referees are Henriette Buyukenya and Regine Mukayiranga of Rwanda; Diana Murungi and Immaculate Ongiera of Uganda; and Joseyline Nsabimana and Anitha Niyokindi of Burundi.

The officiating team also includes Kenya's Josephine Wanjiku and Virginia Wangui, Deka Muse of Djibouti, Mary Sulaimani and Zawadi Yusuf of Tanzania, Yordanos Mulgeta and Woinshet Abera of Ethiopia, Arsema Haile of Eritrea, and Emmanuella Ako and Stella Sebit of South Sudan.

The 10 participating teams are Rayon Sports WFC, Yei Joint Star FC, Mafunzo SC, Denden FC, CBE FC, Kawempe Muslim Ladies, FC Ujeco, Simba Queens, Kenya Police Bullets FC and Top Girls Academy FC.

The three are Henriette Buyukenya, Aline Umutoni and Regine Mukayiranga.

The tournament kicks off on Friday, August 21, at Kigali Pele Stadium, with teams competing for a place in the group stage of the CAF Women's Champions League.

Ahead of the competition, the Council of East and Central African Football Associations (CECAFA) announced the officials who will oversee the matches.

Ali Ahmed, a member of the CECAFA Referees Committee, said the officials are in good condition and ready for the tournament.

'We are pleased with the level of the referees and their assistants who have been invited and are here today. We are confident that they will give their best to ensure that the matches run smoothly,' he said.

The tournament will run from August 21 to 31 in Kigali and will feature 10 teams. A total of eight referees and nine assistant referees have been appointed for the competition.

Umutoni is the only Rwandan referee on the list. She recently officiated at the Women's Africa Cup of Nations in Morocco and will be joined in Kigali by Kenya's Josephine Wanjiku, who also officiated at the continental tournament.

The other referees are Henriette Buyukenya and Regine Mukayiranga of Rwanda; Diana Murungi and Immaculate Ongiera of Uganda; and Joseyline Nsabimana and Anitha Niyokindi of Burundi.

The officiating team also includes Kenya's Josephine Wanjiku and Virginia Wangui, Deka Muse of Djibouti, Mary Sulaimani and Zawadi Yusuf of Tanzania, Yordanos Mulgeta and Woinshet Abera of Ethiopia, Arsema Haile of Eritrea, and Emmanuella Ako and Stella Sebit of South Sudan.

The 10 participating teams are Rayon Sports WFC, Yei Joint Star FC, Mafunzo SC, Denden FC, CBE FC, Kawempe Muslim Ladies, FC Ujeco, Simba Queens, Kenya Police Bullets FC and Top Girls Academy FC.

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/three-rwandan-referees-picked-for-caf-womens-qualifiers-in-kigali/

The couple, who have lived in California since 2020 after stepping back from their roles as senior working royals, are expected to settle in a private residence outside London. Their return could mark a significant new chapter for the family, particularly as their two children, Prince Archie and Princess Lilibet, are expected to begin at a British school in September.

Harry and Meghan stepped back from their royal duties in 2020, saying they wanted to become financially independent and spend more time away from the pressures of life as senior royals. Their decision came amid growing tensions over media coverage, privacy and their position within the Royal Family. They later settled in California, where they have lived for more than six years.

The latest move has reportedly surprised members of the Royal Family. King Charles was informed about the plans last weekend and is said to welcome the opportunity to spend more private time with his son and grandchildren.

Royal commentator Robert Hardman summed up the surprise surrounding the news, telling BBC Radio 4's Today programme: 'Surprise is an understatement.' He added that the Sussexes 'have always been very good at delivering surprises'.

Hardman also highlighted the importance of Archie and Lilibet starting school in Britain, saying it suggested the children would be raised as 'British rather than American'.

There are no plans for Harry or Meghan to return as working royals. They will remain private individuals.

The news comes after Harry's visit to the UK in July, when he met his father at the King's Highgrove home in Gloucestershire. The meeting was described by the Palace as a private family occasion and was reportedly the first time the King had seen Archie and Lilibet in person for more than four years.

However, the return also raises questions about security. Harry has previously expressed concerns about bringing his wife and children to Britain and lost a legal challenge over the level of protection provided to him after he stepped down as a working royal.

It remains unclear what security arrangements will be in place when the family moves back. Hardman suggested some security issues may have been resolved, although details of the arrangements and who will pay for them remain unknown.

The Sussexes have not yet publicly commented on their plans.

Their return is likely to attract considerable interest in Britain and beyond, particularly because of the couple's complicated relationship with the Royal Family and the British press. For their young children, meanwhile, the move could mark the beginning of a new chapter as they experience life and education in the country where their father was born.

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/harry-and-meghans-surprise-move-back-to-the-uk-revealed/

The figures were announced on August 20, 2026, during the official launch of a project aimed at strengthening Rwanda's capacity to respond to fires and other emergencies.

The project is funded by Poland through the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

As part of the project, an assessment was conducted to better understand the causes of fires in Rwanda. 

The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Internal Security, Benjamin Sesonga, said the Rwanda National Police plays an important role in fighting fires but cannot address the challenge alone.

He said cooperation with other institutions and young people is also needed to strengthen fire prevention and response.

'The Rwanda National Police has many responsibilities. We can also help by training young volunteers so that when we get equipment and broader training, we believe we will reach every citizen. When you do not work together with citizens, your activities do not reach everyone,' he said.

Sesonga said this was one of the reasons the project was launched, noting that Rwanda does not want people's property and economic activities to be destroyed by fires.

'We do not want the development we have achieved, the businesses of Rwandans, or someone who establishes a billion-franc factory today to be reduced to ashes the next day. We are using this opportunity so that every individual understands what we are saying and puts the required measures into practice to prevent fires across the country,' he said.

According to the figures presented, 71% of the fires recorded over the past five years were attributed to improper use of electricity, while 13% originated from cooking gas used in households.

Another 8% were linked to illegal activities, including hunting, while 5% were attributed to the improper mixing and storage of materials that can cause fires, including paint stored with gas or petroleum.

The remaining 3% were linked to strong winds and disasters, including landslides and floods, which disrupted electricity-generating infrastructure and resulted in fires.

The Rwanda National Police says more than 90,000 people have so far been trained in fire prevention and response across the country.

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/rwanda-records-1380-fire-incidents-over-five-years/

While dismantling the FDLR may still appear a distant prospect, disarming the group is reportedly part of an agreement between the DRC government and the FDLR aimed at encouraging fighters to voluntarily lay down their weapons, place them in designated facilities and eventually reintegrate them into civilian life.

Rwanda has rejected the arrangement, saying it is not provided for under the Washington peace agreements.

Floribert Anzuluni, the DRC minister responsible for regional integration, confirmed the agreement in July 2026. He later said that an African country had agreed to receive FDLR fighters who refuse to return to Rwanda, adding that discussions were ongoing with other countries.

However, the history of the FDLR suggests that the problem may not end with the laying down of weapons. The group's networks, political structures and ideology could survive, as this is not the first attempt to dismantle the organisation while allowing elements associated with it to remain active.

This has prompted the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes (ICG), which works closely with the European Union, the United States, France and other partners monitoring developments in the region, to remind the DRC that it must dismantle the FDLR as required under the Washington peace agreement.

The ICG has also called on the DRC to establish a clear plan and timetable for dismantling the FDLR and to explain how the group's leaders or fighters suspected of serious crimes will be brought to justice.

The FDLR problem goes beyond weapons

Following the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, members of the defeated former Rwandan Armed Forces (Ex-FAR), Interahamwe militia members and others involved in the genocide fled to then-Zaire, which later became the DRC. The FDLR was established in 2000 by former members of these groups.

The US Treasury Department says the FDLR has committed ethnically motivated violence, killed civilians, abducted people and recruited children as soldiers. These activities have led to sanctions against the group's leaders.

Regional political analysts argue that any country considering receiving FDLR fighters must recognise that disarming them would not automatically eliminate the ideology they have embraced for decades or the support networks they have built.

UN experts' reports have indicated that the FDLR has continued to be led by Rwandans, while increasingly recruiting large numbers of Congolese fighters over the years.

The group has also maintained longstanding links with the DRC authorities. Within the Congolese army, there has reportedly been an officer responsible for coordinating with the FDLR, while FDLR fighters have at times been incorporated into government forces during periods of conflict.

These links demonstrate the resources and influence the group has accumulated during its decades in the DRC, as well as the extent to which it has become embedded in parts of Congolese society and armed networks.

Genocide ideology could move with them

One of the greatest risks for any country receiving FDLR fighters would be allowing the group's former structures and leadership to remain intact.

If leaders and fighters continue operating under what they describe as political objectives, they could potentially maintain activities aimed at destabilising Rwanda or spreading division.

They could do so through networks of supporters built over many years or through social media, allowing their ideology to gradually reach people in the host country and potentially even influence political structures, as has happened in parts of the DRC.

At that point, the issue would no longer simply concern 'former Rwandan fighters'. It could become a domestic security and social problem for the host country if the group's divisive ideology begins taking root there.

Accounts from former FDLR members have frequently referred to military training in Burundi. In recent years, some Burundian officials have also made statements appearing to defend the group or downplay the threat it poses.

Relocating FDLR fighters without dismantling their structures could therefore risk spreading the group's extremist ideology beyond the DRC.

The lesson from the DRC

UN expert reports have documented links between the FDLR and Congolese armed groups including APCLS and Nyatura. The FDLR has also frequently cooperated with the Congolese army and armed groups incorporated into the Wazalendo coalition.

The FDLR has been accused of playing a significant role in the formation and leadership of groups including Nyatura, APCLS and CMC. Its cooperation with such groups has been particularly important because they have provided protection and hiding places for FDLR fighters when attacks were expected.

Another concern is the group's ability to rebuild its resources through illicit economic activities. The United States says the FDLR has generated revenue through mining, kidnapping for ransom, looting and environmental destruction, including charcoal production.

If these sources of financing are not dismantled, the FDLR could potentially recreate them in another country where its fighters are relocated.

Beyond relocation

An African country that agrees to receive some FDLR fighters would need a programme that goes far beyond providing them with a place to live.

The FDLR would need to be disarmed and stripped of its financing networks, while those suspected of involvement in the genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious offences would need to face justice rather than disappear into a broader reintegration programme.

UN principles on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) stress that simply removing fighters from armed groups is not enough. They need support to rebuild civilian lives, while host communities must also be involved so that former fighters can become part of local economic and social activities.

An African country that receives FDLR fighters could therefore give them an opportunity to begin new lives. But if it accepts them as a group that retains its leadership, networks and ideology, it could expose itself to some of the same problems the FDLR has created in the DRC.

More than 12,000 former fighters who left the forests of the DRC and returned to Rwanda have gone through reintegration programmes run by Rwanda's Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC).

They have received training and support to rebuild their lives and are now participating in civilian life and contributing to Rwanda's development.

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/a-closer-look-at-the-risks-for-a-third-country-that-could-host-fdlr-fighters/

The forum took place on August 20, 2026, according to the Rwanda Development Board (RDB).

The event aimed to explore ways to further strengthen cooperation between Rwanda and Brazil while showcasing opportunities available in the African market.

Rwanda's Ambassador to Brazil, Lawrence Manzi, said Rwanda offers Brazilian businesses seeking a foothold in Africa a strategic gateway.

'For Brazilian businesses seeking a foothold in Africa, Rwanda is the gateway of choice. Our ease of doing business and strategic location make Rwanda the perfect bridge to the continent,' Manzi said.

Claver Tuyishimire, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, said Rwanda's small size does not limit its investment opportunities.

'While Rwanda is small in size, it is vast in opportunity. Positioned at the heart of Africa and connected through the AfCFTA and regional markets, Rwanda provides a gateway to over 1.3 billion consumers across the continent,' Tuyishimire said.

The forum comes as Rwanda continues to encourage international investors to take advantage of opportunities in the country and its position as a bridge to different African markets.

In 2025, Rwanda registered investments worth $2.62 billion across 799 projects, up from 612 projects in 2024.

The newly registered investments were concentrated in sectors including real estate, manufacturing and mining.

Rwanda has set a target of doubling private investment to $4.6 billion by 2029.

Rwanda-Brazil ties

Rwanda and Brazil established diplomatic relations in 1981, and the two countries have since signed several agreements to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

In 2019, the two countries signed a Bilateral Air Services Agreement (BASA).

In 2011, Rwanda and Brazil also signed an agreement on cooperation aimed at strengthening food security.

Brazil is the world's leading producer of coffee, soybeans, sugarcane and oranges.

Since 2022, Rwanda has imported wheat from Brazil after imports from Ukraine declined. Rwanda also imports products including sugar from Brazil.

In February 2026, the governments of Rwanda and Brazil signed an agreement providing a framework for cooperation in promoting trade, facilitating investment and strengthening cooperation in various sectors.

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/rwanda-woos-brazilian-investors-at-sao-paulo-business-forum/

Montréal will host the 99th edition of the World Championships, following the 2025 edition held in Kigali, which was the first time the competition was staged on the African continent.

National team coach Félix Sempoma selected the 19 cyclists who began the training camp this week. Their preparations will run until September 16, 2026, before they travel to Canada for the World Championships scheduled for September 20-27.

The group includes cyclists competing in the elite men's and women's categories, Under-23 and junior categories for riders under the age of 19.

In the women's junior category, those attending the training camp are Yvonne Masengesho, Donatha Akimana and Zawadi Kanyange.

The elite and Under-23 women's group includes Xaveline Nirere, Claudette Nyirarukundo, Diane Ingabire, Liliane Uwiringiyimana (U23), Mariate Byukusenge (U23) and Jazilla Mwamikazi (U23), who is currently training in Europe.

In the men's elite category, Shemu Nsengiyumva is the only rider above the age of 23. The other riders are Shadrack Ufitimana, Aimé Ruhumuriza, Kevin Nshutiraguma and Samuel Niyonkuru.

The junior men's riders attending the training camp are Brian Ishimwe, Jackson Nkurikiyinka, Jonathan Rafiki Muhawenimana, Pacifique Byusa and Jules Mugabo.

In 2025, Rwanda was represented by 23 cyclists when the World Championships were held in Kigali.

Fourteen of those cyclists have been selected again for the 2026 preparations. They are Nsengiyumva Shemu, Niyonkuru Samuel, Ufitimana Shadrack, Ruhumuriza Aimé, Nshutiraguma Kevin, Ishimwe Brian, Byusa Pacifique, Nkurikiyinka Jackson, Ingabire Diane, Nyirarukundo Claudette, Uwiringiyimana Liliane, Mwamikazi Jazilla, Nirere Xaveline and Masengesho Yvonne.

Source : https://new.igihe.com/english/19-rwandan-cyclists-prepare-for-2026-world-championships/