Communication Minister and government spokesperson René Emmanuel Sadi said on Sunday that the 93-year-old leader was expected back soon, dismissing rumours surrounding his prolonged stay abroad.
'The president is alive. There is no power vacuum,' Sadi said in an interview with Radio France Internationale (RFI), without providing details on when Biya would return.
Biya has not been seen publicly since June 7, when he left Cameroon for what officials described as a 'brief private stay' in Switzerland. The absence, which has now lasted more than 50 days, has renewed questions about the health of the world's oldest serving head of state.
The government has repeatedly rejected reports suggesting that Biya is seriously ill. Sadi previously said the president was in good health and continuing to work from Geneva, where he has spent extended periods in recent years.
'Reports claiming otherwise are pure fantasy and malicious manipulation aimed at destabilising opinion,' Sadi said.
Other senior officials have also defended Biya's absence. Higher Education Minister Jacques Fame Ndongo said the president had continued to follow government matters through documents submitted by his aides.
Labour Minister Grégoire Owona offered a different explanation, describing Biya's absence as annual leave and arguing that the president, like any other citizen, had the right to take time off.
'Paul Biya, elected by the Cameroonian people and paid by them, is a worker who has the right to annual leave,' Owona said.
However, opposition figures have criticised the lack of clarity surrounding the president's whereabouts and the extended nature of his stay abroad.
Mamadou Mota, vice-president of the opposition Cameroon Renaissance Movement, said Biya's absence had created an 'institutional vacuum', arguing that the country could not be governed remotely while facing major social and economic challenges.
Concerns have also grown because Biya has yet to appoint a new government after being sworn in for his eighth consecutive seven-year term in November 2025. The presidential election that secured his latest mandate was disputed by opposition groups, which alleged irregularities and voter suppression.
Cameroon's authorities banned public discussion of Biya's health in October 2024 after another prolonged absence, but speculation has continued online, with social media users reviving jokes describing him as a 'remote-work president'.
The debate has also raised questions about succession arrangements. Parliament restored the office of vice-president in April as part of constitutional reforms, but the position remains vacant, leaving no designated deputy should the president become temporarily or permanently unable to perform his duties.
Meanwhile, political tensions have intensified within the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), with senior party officials recently holding a rare meeting described only as an 'important working session'.
Biya, who first became president in 1982, has increasingly spent time outside Cameroon in recent years, particularly in Switzerland. His long absences have become a recurring source of debate over governance.
President Paul Biya has not been seen publicly since June 7, when he left Cameroon for what officials described as a 'brief private stay' in Switzerland.
His remarks come after the Rwanda Food and Drugs Authority (Rwanda FDA) suspended the operations of eight alcohol manufacturers following an inspection aimed at assessing compliance with regulations governing the production of fermented beverages.
The suspension, announced on August 2, 2026, specifically targeted manufacturers producing locally made spirits. Their products were immediately withdrawn from the market.
In a statement, Rwanda FDA said the decision was taken to protect public health and strengthen oversight of product quality on the market.
Speaking to RBA, Dr. Nsanzimana described the growing impact of substandard alcohol as a public health epidemic, citing the sharp rise in alcohol-related illnesses recorded across the country.
'We consider this a public health emergency based on the data we have. Since the beginning of this year, our hospitals have treated slightly more than 500 people who became ill after consuming these alcoholic drinks.
'In Ngoma alone, more than 100 people were hospitalized at once. We have also recorded cases in Nyagatare and the Southern Province. These are only the people who reached health facilities and were treated although some died. Others died before making it to hospital. So far, we have documented about 50 deaths,' he said.
The Health Minister added that the health consequences extend far beyond fatalities.
According to him, around 100 people have suffered permanent blindness, while others have developed long-term brain damage, liver disease and other serious medical conditions linked to the consumption of unsafe alcohol.
'The problem has been growing gradually. We used to know traditional drinks such as banana beer and sorghum beer. Then came alcoholic beverages with alcohol concentrations of 40 to 50 percent, far stronger than what many people had ever consumed. Now there are also those being produced through unsafe methods,' he said.
Dr. Nsanzimana warned that Rwanda must treat the issue as a public health emergency.
'This is an epidemic, and we must fight it as one. If we fail to act now, we will pay a much heavier price in the future.'
He further explained that while some investors establish legitimate factories to produce quality beverages, others secretly mix hazardous chemicals into alcoholic drinks before packaging and distributing them to consumers, exposing the public to severe illness and death.
Health Minister Dr. Nsanzimana said substandard alcohol should be fought with the same urgency as other public health epidemics.
On August 2, 2026, RED-Tabara shared videos on social media showing two of its new fighters, who said they were proud of their decision to join the armed struggle to 'liberate' Burundi.
Among those featured was a Burundian woman who said she had left her job in Canada to join RED-Tabara, claiming she wanted to contribute to efforts to help Burundians.
'There may be another role I am needed for in the struggle. If I left my job, because I was working in Canada, and decided to stop it and say, 'I am going to the forest with others,' it is because I have confidence in this cause,' she said.
Reacting to the video, Minister Bizimana accused some countries of supporting instability in Burundi and the wider region, saying his government was monitoring diplomats allegedly involved in such activities.
'A Canadian fighter in RED-Tabara: some countries are encouraging disorder and divisions in Burundi and the region. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Burundi is closely monitoring all diplomats involved in hostile acts, and measures will be taken,' Bizimana said.
RED-Tabara emerged amid political tensions in Burundi in 2015, when then-President Pierre Nkurunziza sought a controversial third term in office.
The group claims that the time for the 'liberation' of the country is approaching.
Minister Bizimana said Burundi is closely monitoring all diplomats accused of seeking to fuel instability.The Burundian woman said she left her job in Canada to join RED-Tabara, claiming she wanted to help liberate Burundians.
The regulator announced on August 2, 2026, that the action followed regulatory inspections and compliance assessments, with the measures being taken 'in the interest of public health.'
Rwanda FDA said it had closed the affected manufacturing facilities, revoked their licences and ordered the withdrawal of all products from the market.
Among the affected companies is Ingufu Gin Ltd, whose products listed for recall include Red Waragi, Rabiant Gin, Ngufu Gin, King's Vodka, Royal Castle Gin, Medal Gin, G&S Rum, New House Potable Spirit, Club Potable Spirit and Hometown Potable Spirit.
NBG Ltd was also ordered to halt production, with products including United Flavoured Gin, Bombastic Coconut Flavoured Gin, Ingwe Flavoured Gin, Amerikaan Flavoured Gin, Maguma Gin and Fimbo Blended Banana Brandy subject to recall.
Other manufacturers affected include SKY Drop Industries Ltd, Africana Buffalo Ltd, NOPA Company Ltd, Roots Investment Group Ltd, Rugali Agro-processing Company and Zhonglu Industrial Liability Company Ltd.
The recalled products from the companies include various brands of gin, whisky, vodka, rum, brandy and other flavoured alcoholic beverages.
Rwanda FDA instructed the manufacturers to immediately begin a full recall process and direct their distributors to collect the listed products from clients and return existing stock to the manufacturers' premises.
The manufacturers have been given three working days to submit recall reports to the regulator.
Distributors and retailers were also directed to immediately stop selling or distributing the affected products and return remaining quantities to their suppliers, distributors or manufacturers.
'Non-compliance with all the above will result in measures under applicable regulatory provisions,' Rwanda FDA warned.
The authority further urged consumers to immediately stop consuming the listed alcoholic beverages.
Rwanda FDA said additional affected manufacturing facilities will be announced in due course as regulatory enforcement continues.
Rwanda FDA said it had closed the affected manufacturing facilities, revoked their licences and ordered the withdrawal of all products from the market.
As of Thursday, the DRC had reported 3,605 confirmed cases of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, including 1,587 deaths, representing a case fatality rate of 44 percent, the WHO said in its latest disease outbreak report.
The previous largest outbreak, which struck the country's east between 2018 and 2020, recorded 3,317 confirmed cases.
The current outbreak, initially confined to the Mongbwalu health zone in the province of Ituri, has spread over the past two months to 49 health zones across five provinces: Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele and Tshopo.
The outbreak has also taken a growing toll on health workers, with 151 infections and 44 deaths reported so far, highlighting persistent gaps in infection prevention and control at health facilities, the WHO said.
The agency warned that insecurity, population displacement, high mobility and cross-border movements were hampering surveillance and response operations, raising the risk of further spread.
The outbreak is unfolding in conflict-affected areas where access to health care, clean water, food and shelter remains limited. Attacks on health facilities have restricted access for response teams and increased the risk of transmission going undetected.
Assessing the risk within the DRC as 'very high,' the WHO said a substantial expansion of surveillance, testing, clinical care, infection control, community engagement and logistics was needed to get ahead of the outbreak.
The current outbreak, initially confined to the Mongbwalu health zone in the province of Ituri, has spread over the past two months to 49 health zones across five provinces: Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Haut-Uele and Tshopo.
The FDLR was formed by individuals involved in planning and carrying out the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, including former political leaders, members of the defeated Rwandan Armed Forces (Ex-FAR), and fighters from the Interahamwe militia. Despite years of military operations against it, the group continues to recruit new members, particularly young fighters.
Operating from eastern DRC, the FDLR has long been cited by Rwanda as a direct threat to its national security because of its presence near the shared border. The Congolese government, however, has often argued that defeating AFC/M23 should take precedence over military action against the FDLR.
The group's presence has featured prominently in regional peace efforts, including mediation talks held in Pretoria more than two decades ago, negotiations in Luanda in 2022, and discussions in Washington beginning in early 2025.
The Washington Peace Agreement included commitments to dismantle the FDLR through measures outlined in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). However, despite signing the agreement, the DRC has continued to send conflicting signals regarding how it intends to address the group.
From denial to acknowledgement
For years, officials in Kinshasa maintained that the FDLR no longer posed a meaningful threat to Rwanda, arguing that the movement had become too weak to destabilize the region.
Congolese authorities also accused Rwanda of exaggerating the threat in order to justify interference in the DRC's internal affairs and gain access to the country's mineral resources.
In March 2025, former Foreign Affairs Minister Christophe Lutundula questioned whether the group even existed.
'The time had come for us to eliminate those remaining FDLR fighters Rwanda keeps talking about, but I don't believe they exist. I don't even know who they are,' he said.
Lutundula, who consistently argued during his tenure as foreign minister that the FDLR was no longer a significant force, also suggested Rwanda itself had shifted its narrative.
'Is Rwanda still talking about the FDLR the way it used to? No. The real issue now is the economy,' he stated.
Following the signing of the Washington Peace Agreement in June 2025, DRC Minister for Foreign Trade Julien Paluku also dismissed the existence of the FDLR, describing it as a narrative created by Rwanda.
Paluku argued that references to the group had misled the international community for three decades and accused Rwanda of using the issue to justify military intervention and the exploitation of Congolese mineral resources.
'The real FDLR Rwanda is looking for in the DRC is Congo's minerals,' he said.
Rwanda's ambassador to Algeria, Vincent Karega, said such remarks were unsurprising given Paluku's previous role as governor of North Kivu Province, where the FDLR has long operated, including in Virunga National Park.
Official acknowledgement
Despite these statements, the Congolese government had previously acknowledged both the existence of the FDLR and the threat it posed. On April 15, 2024, then FARDC spokesperson Maj. Gen. Sylvain Ekenge told Congolese state television that the FDLR was active in the country and had played a major role in violence against civilians.
'The FDLR attacks Congolese people and kills Congolese people. Of the more than 10 million people who have died over the past decade, the FDLR bears significant responsibility for those deaths,' he said.
On April 15, 2024, then FARDC spokesperson Maj. Gen. Sylvain Ekenge told Congolese state television that the FDLR was active in the country and had played a major role in violence against civilians.
Ekenge's remarks carried particular weight because he had previously served in North Kivu Province as military spokesperson for operations in the region and later as acting military governor.
His comments marked a significant departure from years of inconsistent messaging by the Congolese government regarding the FDLR.
In October 2025, the Congolese army issued a directive ordering its troops to end all cooperation with the FDLR. It also called on the group's fighters to lay down their arms, warning that those who refused would face military action.
Despite the announcement, cooperation between the FARDC and the FDLR continued. The armed group reportedly continued receiving weapons and ammunition, while the 90-day deadline for its dismantlement expired without any meaningful progress.
Shifting explanations
As pressure mounted over its failure to dismantle the FDLR, the Congolese government began advancing a different explanation. Officials argued that many of the group's fighters were based in areas controlled by AFC/M23, making it difficult for the army to carry out operations against them.
In late March 2026, the FARDC announced in Kisangani that it had launched operations targeting the FDLR. Two days later, however, the army reportedly delivered weapons and ammunition to FDLR fighters in Pinga, Walikale Territory, where the group was fighting alongside government forces against AFC/M23.
A report by the UN Group of Experts, published in late June 2026, stated that the Congolese army had assured the FDLR it would not move to dismantle the group and that both sides would continue working together as strategic partners.
According to reports from eastern DRC, FDLR fighters based in government-controlled territory were advised to relocate to areas under AFC/M23 control, creating the impression that military operations against the group could not be carried out.
On July 30, 2026, FDLR political spokesperson Cure Ngoma claimed that the group's fighters were now located exclusively in areas controlled by AFC/M23.
'We are based in eastern Congo, specifically in the areas occupied by M23 and Rwanda. That is where our forces are located,' he said.
However, discussions held under the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), which brings together representatives from Rwanda, the DRC and the United States, concluded that while some FDLR fighters were indeed present in AFC/M23-controlled areas, others remained in territory controlled by the Congolese government.
In June 2026, U.S. Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos told the UN Security Council that the DRC had failed to fulfil its commitment to dismantle the FDLR, even in areas under its own control.
'Despite progress, the parties continue to fall short on their obligations. The DRC has not upheld obligations for the FDLR neutralization, at least in the areas that they control,' Boulos pointed out.
A new approach to the FDLR
In recent weeks, a document circulating in international media has added another dimension to the debate.
The document, reportedly signed by FDLR president Lt. Gen. Victor Byiringiro on May 30, 2026, and addressed to President Félix Tshisekedi, outlines a proposal for the group's fighters to disarm, undergo reintegration, and be placed in secure, supervised facilities.
The proposal has been presented as a roadmap for the group's voluntary dissolution.
Since July 13, DRC Minister for Regional Integration Floribert Anzuluni has circulated the document among governments in Africa and Europe, presenting it as evidence that Kinshasa had reached an agreement with the FDLR on voluntary disarmament.
Rwanda, however, maintains that such an arrangement falls outside the framework of the Washington Peace Agreement.
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister Ambassador Olivier Nduhungirehe has argued that the reported proposal is not provided for under the agreement, which requires the FDLR to be dismantled through the agreed CONOPS framework.
On July 29, Nduhungirehe reiterated that the FDLR was never a party to the Washington Peace Agreement but rather the security threat the agreement seeks to eliminate.
'The signing of this so-called 'protocol' between the father (the Congolese government), the son (the FDLR), and the evil spirit (the genocide ideology) is in no way consistent with the Washington Peace Agreement, which makes no provision for such an arrangement. For good reason: the genocidal FDLR is not a party to the agreement; rather, it is the subject of it,' he stressed.
The following day, DRC government spokesperson Patrick Muyaya defended Kinshasa's position, saying that if the FDLR had voluntarily agreed to disarm and enter a reintegration process, there would be no justification for launching military operations against it.
'You do not use force against people who have voluntarily chosen the path of peace,' Muyaya argued.
After years of downplaying the FDLR's capabilities, Patrick Muyaya openly stated that the DRC government could not launch military action against the group because it had chosen the path of peace.
Political analyst Prof. Bob Kabamba of the University of Liège has cautioned that even if the FDLR were officially declared dissolved, the organisation could simply re-emerge under a different name.
Before becoming the FDLR, the movement previously operated as RDR and later ALiR, while its military command, political leadership and objectives remained largely unchanged.
The evolution of Kinshasa's public position, from questioning the FDLR's existence, to acknowledging it as a security threat, and more recently supporting a voluntary disarmament process rather than military dismantlement, has become one of the central points of contention in the implementation of the Washington Peace Agreement.
The DRC government has for years changed its narrative on the FDLR, at times denying the group's existence and at other times portraying it as a weakened force made up of aging fighters.
Implementation means verifiable dismantlement, not theatre.
To understand why Rwanda's position admits no softening, one must first be honest about what the FDLR is — because the entire case for 'dialogue' rests on misdescribing it.
A project, not a party
The FDLR is not a rebel movement with grievances that negotiation could address. It is the organisational afterlife of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Founded in 2000 in the forests of eastern DR Congo, it gathered up the remnants of the ex-FAR — the army that planned and executed the genocide — and the Interahamwe militia that carried out the killing hill by hill. Its founding cadres did not flee Rwanda as dissidents; they fled as perpetrators, taking their command structures, their weapons and their ideology with them.
That ideology has never been retired. Senior FDLR officers have declared, repeatedly and on the record, that their return to Rwanda is conditioned on the country being 'cleansed' of its Tutsi population. This is not an accusation inferred from conduct; it is the group's own stated horizon. An organisation whose political programme is the completion of a genocide does not have a negotiating position. It has a confession.
Dialogue, in any meaningful sense, requires a shared floor: each party recognises the other's right to exist. The FDLR's foundational premise is the denial of exactly that right to an entire people. You cannot split the difference with extermination. There is no halfway point between a population living and a population erased, and any mediator who pretends otherwise is not advancing peace — he is laundering genocide ideology into the vocabulary of politics.
The victims Kinshasa forgets are its own
Here is the element too often missing from this debate: the FDLR's longest-suffering victims, after the Tutsi of Rwanda, are the Congolese themselves. For a quarter of a century this militia has fed on eastern DR Congo, taxing its minerals, burning its villages, and punishing its civilians for every military setback. United Nations investigators have documented its massacres of Congolese villagers and its campaigns of mass rape in the Kivus. UN Group of Experts reporting has likewise detailed the FDLR's embedding within Congolese armed structures and its battlefield cooperation with Wazalendo militias, the very integration that makes announcements of 'voluntary disarmament' ring hollow while its fighters remain on active front lines.
A Congolese official who offers the FDLR a seat at a political table is not merely offending Rwanda. He is telling the survivors of the militia's Congolese atrocities that the men who did it have been promoted from criminals to counterparts.
Nor has the menace stayed on one side of the border. Over the years the FDLR has run incursions into Rwanda's Western Province and been linked to grenade attacks that killed and maimed civilians in Kigali, each operation an attempt to export terror into a country that has spent three decades rebuilding itself from mass graves.
The law has already spoken
The second missing element is this: the question of what the FDLR is has already been answered, not by Kigali, but by the world's courts and councils. The group and its leaders have sat under UN Security Council sanctions for some two decades. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for its supreme commander, Sylvestre Mudacumura, for war crimes. A German court in Stuttgart convicted its president, Ignace Murwanashyaka, for atrocities his organisation committed — a genocidaire leadership run, for years, from European soil, prosecuted under universal jurisdiction.
This is the legal reality a 'political dialogue' would have to overturn. Negotiation confers standing; that is its nature. To seat the FDLR at a table is to walk back, by protocol, what sanctions committees, prosecutors and judges established by evidence: that this is not a political actor but a criminal enterprise animated by the gravest crime in international law.
The door that is already open
The third missing element demolishes the claim that Rwanda's refusal leaves the FDLR's fighters no way out. It leaves them exactly one, and thousands have taken it.
For more than twenty years, Rwanda has operated one of the most extensive demobilisation and reintegration programmes on the continent. Rank-and-file combatants who lay down their arms are received at the Mutobo demobilisation centre in Musanze, rehabilitated, and returned to their communities; many thousands of former fighters from armed groups in the DR Congo, the FDLR chief among them, have come home this way, alongside family members who followed them out of the forest. They were not negotiated with. They were welcomed, as individuals renouncing a criminal project, not as delegates of it.
That distinction is the whole argument. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is a door for men. A political dialogue is a platform for an ideology. Rwanda has held the first open for two decades and will keep it open. The second it will never build, because the 'cause' the FDLR's leadership would bring to any table is the unfinished business of 1994.
What Washington actually requires
Which brings us back to the present moment. The peace framework the DR Congo and Rwanda signed in Washington in 2025 does not speak of accommodating the FDLR; it obligates its neutralisation, under a concept of operations both governments endorsed — irreversible, verifiable, and measured in dismantled command structures, not press conferences. A signed protocol with a militia that remains interwoven with the Congolese army and active in ongoing fighting is not neutralisation. It is choreography, and everyone in the region can tell the difference between a militia being dismantled and a militia being rebranded.
For that is the tactical truth beneath the diplomatic language: as military pressure and international scrutiny have shrunk its space, the FDLR has reached for the oldest trick of cornered armed movements — the costume change. Yesterday's genocidaires present themselves as today's 'political opposition in exile,' hoping the world's memory is shorter than its outrage. The rebranding must fail, and be seen to fail, because the precedent at stake reaches far beyond the Great Lakes. If an organisation founded on extermination can wait out the world and be repackaged as a dialogue partner, then every génocidaire on earth has been handed a strategy: survive, relocate, rename, negotiate.
The seat that is reserved
Rwanda's three decades of recovery were built on a covenant with its dead and its survivors: unity, accountability, and the refusal to barter either. To trade that covenant for the political blackmail of a genocidal militia would betray more than a million victims of the Genocide against the Tutsi and gamble the security of the millions now living in the peace they were denied.
So let the record state Rwanda's position without varnish. For fighters who abandon the FDLR, the road home through demobilisation remains open, as it has been for twenty years. For the organisation and the leaders who carry its exterminationist charter, there will be no concessions, no false symmetry, and no chair — not in Kigali, not in Kinshasa, not in any capital that takes the word 'genocide' seriously.
A seat is, in fact, reserved for them. It is in the dock, facing their judges. It is the only table at which the FDLR has ever had anything legitimate to say.
The FDLR is not a rebel movement with grievances that negotiation could address. It is the organisational afterlife of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.
The influx prompted Madrid to deploy military support, tighten border controls and enhance coordination with Rabat, while reigniting debate within the EU over how to manage migration at its external borders.
What's special about Ceuta?
Ceuta is one of Spain's two exclaves on the North African coast, alongside Melilla. Although geographically located in Africa, it forms part of the EU's external border.
Its location has long made it one of Europe's most sensitive migration gateways. For years, undocumented migrants have attempted to reach the enclave by climbing border fences or swimming around coastal barriers before trying to continue to mainland Spain and other parts of Europe.
Spain and Morocco have expanded cooperation in recent years on border control, migrant returns and efforts to combat human trafficking and smuggling networks.
As thousands gathered near the border, Moroccan security forces used batons and tear gas to push back crowds.
What triggered the surge?
In late June and early July, Spain's Supreme Court ruled that migrants intercepted at sea near Ceuta and Melilla could not be summarily returned under the special 'pushback' regime applied at land borders. Instead, they must go through standard legal procedures that provide access to legal assistance and the opportunity to apply for international protection.
The ruling was quickly distorted online into claims that anyone who reached Ceuta by sea would automatically be allowed to stay in Spain and eventually obtain legal residency. The narrative spread rapidly across various social media platforms, leading many to believe the route was effectively open.
Abdellah, a Moroccan who attempted to reach Ceuta but was later turned back by police, said videos circulating online had convinced him to make the journey.
Mohammed Zakaria Aboudahab, a professor of public law and political science at Mohammed V University in Morocco, said migrant-smuggling networks had deliberately amplified false information on social media, creating the impression that reaching Ceuta guaranteed legal status.
Spain and Morocco's response
The latest influx saw more than 50,000 undocumented migrants enter Ceuta, many by swimming around the Tarajal border crossing or using makeshift flotation devices. At least 67 people died during the crossings, with the death toll expected to rise as search and recovery operations continue.
By August 1, more than 48,000 migrants had returned to Morocco. None were allowed to travel onward to mainland Spain under Ceuta's special Schengen arrangements, and authorities said the immediate pressure at the border had largely eased.
Spain has since reinforced security by installing a new floating maritime barrier along Ceuta's breakwater. The 500-meter inflatable barrier is designed to prevent migrants from bypassing land border controls by sea.
At the same time, Madrid and Rabat have intensified cooperation on returns and law enforcement while stepping up efforts against migrant-smuggling networks.
Moroccan authorities said they had arrested 70 people suspected of organizing or participating in violence linked to the mass crossing. Xinhua reporters in Rabat and Casablanca also observed tighter security at railway stations and bus terminals, where police were screening and, when necessary, turning back groups of young people heading toward northern Morocco.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez (C) observes the work of the Civil Guard in Spain's North African enclave of Ceuta, on July 31, 2026.
EU and regional reactions
The crisis has once again exposed divisions within Europe over migration policy.
The European Commission reaffirmed that Ceuta forms part of the EU's external border and said the bloc stands ready to support Spain through Frontex and other mechanisms while strengthening cooperation with Morocco.
Italy was among the first countries to criticize Spain's migration policy. It later joined Denmark in leading a letter signed by 22 EU member states calling for an emergency ministerial meeting to discuss the crisis and the bloc's external border management.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez responded by writing to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, expressing 'serious concern' over what he described as 'selfish,' politically motivated reactions from some governments that he said violated EU law, including proposals to suspend Schengen cooperation with Spain. He also called for an EU-wide ministerial meeting.
Ireland, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, subsequently announced that EU interior ministers would hold a videoconference on Tuesday to discuss the Ceuta crisis.
The Rwanda Meteorology Agency forecast indicates that maximum temperatures will range between 21°C and 32°C, while minimum temperatures are expected to remain between 10°C and 18°C. The expected maximum temperatures are slightly above the normal August range, which usually falls between 20°C and 31°C.
The highest temperatures, ranging from 31°C to 32°C, are expected in parts of southern Kigali City, eastern Bugesera, Kayonza, Kirehe and Gisagara districts, western parts of Ngoma District, as well as the Bugarama plain.
Meanwhile, cooler conditions are expected in parts of Nyabihu District, western and northern areas of Ngororero and Musanze districts, and eastern parts of Rubavu and Rutsiro districts, where maximum temperatures are forecast to range between 21°C and 23°C.
Minimum temperatures will remain within the normal August range, with the coldest areas expected to record between 10°C and 12°C. These include parts of Nyabihu, Nyamagabe and Nyaruguru districts, northern and western parts of Musanze and Ngororero, northern Gakenke and Rulindo, southern Burera, western Gicumbi, and parts of Rusizi, Nyamasheke, Rutsiro and Rubavu.
The warmest nights and early mornings are expected in central and western Kigali City, Nyagatare, Gatsibo, Kayonza and Kirehe districts, as well as the Bugarama plain, where minimum temperatures could range between 16°C and 18°C.
Rainfall expected below average
The country is expected to receive between 5 and 100 millimetres of rainfall during August, below the long-term average range of 20 to 126 millimetres for the month.
The highest rainfall amounts, ranging between 80 and 100 millimetres, are forecast in western parts of Musanze District and northern areas of Nyabihu and Rubavu districts.
Rainfall between 60 and 80 millimetres is expected in parts of Musanze, Nyabihu, Rubavu, Burera, Gakenke, Nyamagabe, Ngororero, Karongi and Nyamasheke districts.
Several other parts of the country are expected to receive between 20 and 60 millimetres, while some areas are forecast to receive as little as 5 to 20 millimetres.
Strong winds expected in some areas
Moderate to strong winds are expected across the country, with speeds ranging between 4 and 12 metres per second.
Strong winds of between 8 and 12 metres per second are forecast in parts of Rusizi, Nyamasheke, Karongi, Rutsiro, Rubavu, Burera and Kirehe districts, as well as parts of Nyamagabe, Ngororero, Nyabihu, Gicumbi, Gatsibo, Ngoma, Nyagatare and Kayonza.
Moderate winds of between 4 and 6 metres per second are expected in parts of Kigali City, Musanze, Rulindo, Nyanza, Gakenke, Nyabihu and Gisagara districts, while other parts of the country are expected to experience winds ranging between 6 and 8 metres per second.
The expected maximum temperatures are slightly above the normal August range, which usually falls between 20°C and 31°C.
Rwanda's Rayon Sports, Sudanese giants Al Hilal, Kenya's Gor Mahia and South Sudan's Jamus SC have secured places in the semifinals, setting up two exciting clashes as teams battle for a place in the final.
Rayon Sports booked their semifinal spot in style, finishing the group stage with a perfect record after winning all three matches.
The Rwandan side defeated Al Hilal 1-0 on Saturday at Amahoro Stadium, with Antonio Atisso Kodjo scoring the decisive goal in the 16th minute. The victory saw Rayon finish top of their group with nine points, having shown both attacking quality and defensive resilience throughout the opening stage.
Rayon Sport defeated Al Hilal 1-0 on Saturday at Amahoro Stadium, with Antonio Atisso Kodjo scoring the decisive goal in the 16th minute.
The Blues will now face Jamus SC, one of the tournament's surprise performers, in the second semifinal.
Jamus SC, representing South Sudan, reached the knockout stage after impressive displays against more established regional sides, earning recognition as one of the emerging teams in this year's competition.
Rayon Sports head coach Christian Haringingo said reaching the semifinals was an important step for his team as they continue preparations for the new season.
'This is part of pre-season and we are now ready to face any team in the semifinal stage,' Haringingo said.
In the other semifinal, Al Hilal will take on Kenya's Gor Mahia in a clash expected to attract attention across the region.
Despite losing to Rayon Sports, Al Hilal advanced as the best second-placed team after collecting six points from the group stage. The Sudanese side showed attacking threat throughout the tournament and will look to bounce back when they face Gor Mahia.
Al Hilal advanced as the best second-placed team after collecting six points from the group stage.
Gor Mahia, one of East Africa's most decorated clubs, secured their place in the last four after a strong group-stage campaign and will be aiming to add another regional title to their historic record.
Meanwhile, Tusker FC and Zanzibar's KVZ SC were eliminated after finishing third and fourth respectively in their group.
Tusker ended their campaign with a 2-0 victory over KVZ SC, with Ian Simiyu and Victor Mbaoma scoring the goals, but the result was not enough to keep the Kenyan side in contention.
The semifinals will be played on August 4 at Kigali Pele Stadium, with the remaining teams now focused on taking the final steps toward lifting the CECAFA Kagame Cup trophy.
Rwanda's Rayon Sports, Sudanese giants Al Hilal, Kenya's Gor Mahia and South Sudan's Jamus SC have secured places in the semifinals, setting up two exciting clashes as teams battle for a place in the final.
